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At the beginning of the 21st century, Japan and India started to build their bilateral 
relationship. This growth happened despite Japan having cut off almost all relations with 
India two years previously after India’s nuclear weapons test and the previous minimal 
nature of the relationship. The relationship has grown from almost nothing to include 
annual meetings of the prime ministers, a free trade agreement, maritime security 
cooperation, and annual military exercises. This thesis looks at an array of factors within 
great power dynamics, multilateral and bilateral institutions, and domestic politics to 
determine the underlying cause behind Japan’s and India’s actions to determine the 
transience or permanence of the relations. It is concluded that balance of power 
considerations are the primary reason for increased Japan-India interaction. These 
considerations are influenced by the increasing activism of India and Japan in world 
affairs and the lack of historical controversies between the two states. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since India gained its independence from Britain, and Japan regained sovereignty 
after World War II (WWII), the two countries maintained cordial but distant relations for 
most of the twentieth century. In 1998, however, Japan cut off most of its Official 
Developmental Assistance (ODA) and took other actions against India after the Pokhoran 
II tests. As the 21st century began, Japan-India relations changed again with increased 
contact, cooperation, and interaction. In 2000, despite the issues of the prior two years, 
Prime Minister Mori visited New Delhi and called India and Japan “global partners,” a 
phrase previously reserved for the United States.1 With this visit, Mori started to create a 
relationship that went beyond “the nuclear problem.”2 During the meeting between Prime 
Ministers Mori and Vajpayee, Mori’s goal was to “build a multifaceted cooperative 
relationship with India in a wide range of fields,” including proliferation, United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) reforms, economic exchange, security and defense, youth 
exchanges, and infrastructure improvement.3 Since that visit, minister and flag officer 
level meetings have tripled, including the first meetings between defense ministers in 
decades.4 Other developments include annual coast guard exercises that began months 
after Prime Minister Mori’s visit, a signed a joint declaration on security cooperation in 
2008, and bilateral naval exercises that have increased in frequency, becoming an annual 
                                                 
1 Purnendra Jain, "Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," Japanese Studies 28, no. 1 (May, 
2008): 17, ProQuest (58773079). 
2 K. V. Kesavan, India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period, 
(Occasional Paper, Observer Research Foundation, May 2010), 9–10, ProQuest (754079921). 
3 “Japan-India Summit Meeting (Summary),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 23, 2000, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0008/india_s.html. 
4 “Japan-India Relations (Basic Data),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 2012, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html. 
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occurrence in 2012.5 Japan and India also created the Japan-India Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed in 2011, which is only the third such 
agreement for India, as well as the most comprehensive.6  
This thesis addresses a core question arising from these developments: What is 
driving this rapid shift in Japan-India relations, and will it continue and grow or will 
relations return to the previous state of benign disinterest? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
During the last quarter century, the world has undergone many changes, including 
the end of the Cold War, increasing globalization, and America’s War on Terror. At the 
same time, Asia has been rising in prominence in world affairs, with Japan and India as 
two of the three strongest countries in the region.  In 2012, Japan and India had the third 
and tenth largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world, respectively, while China, 
the other Asian power, had the second largest.7 In terms of Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP), India and Japan rank third and fourth, behind the United States and China.8 A 
stronger India-Japan defense relationship has the potential of stimulating trade linkages, 
which could change the economic landscape due to the size of their respective 
economies. 
Beyond economics, Asia is home to the fastest growing military budgets in the 
world. While the percentage of military budgets for Japan, India, and China has remained 
                                                 
5 Dipankar Banerjee Ramesh Thakur, ed., Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations: An 
Indo-Japanese Dialogue, (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2006), xxi; Rupakjyoti Borah, Japan-India Maritime 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects and Problems (Gandhinagar, India: Pandit Deendayal 
Petroleum University, 2012), 7, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/120315-Rupakjyoti_Borah.pdf; 
Purnendra Jain, “Japan’s Expanding Security Networks: India and Australia,” Indian Journal of Asian 
Affairs (June-December 2009): 1, JSTOR (41950493); National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian 
Strategic Review 2013 (Tokyo: NIDS, 2013), 127, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-
asian/e2013.html. 
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Ministry of External Affairs of India, Japan-India 
Economic Partnership Agreement (Tokyo: MOFA, 2011), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/india.html. 
7 GDP Ranking, World Bank Group, May 7, 2014, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 
8 GDP Ranking PPP Based, World Bank Group, May 7, 2014, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf. 
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fairly constant in terms of percent GDP from 1989 to 2013, the value of expenditures has 
risen drastically. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 
(SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, India more than doubled its military spending 
and was usually in the top ten spenders in the world for that quarter century.9 SIPRI’s 
information indicates that Japan increased spending by half during the same period and 
was usually in the top five. These numbers, however, pale in comparison to China, which 
according to the same source increased its military spending by a factor of ten and rose 
from the eleventh to the second highest military spender in the world during the same 
quarter century. Some, like Christopher Hughes, feel that Japan currently has the most 
technologically sophisticated conventional military in East Asia, although it is limited by 
imbalances.10 India and two of its neighbors, Pakistan and China, each possess nuclear 
weapons. Further increasing military tensions in the region, India and Japan both have 
border disputes with neighboring countries. With these large and growing militaries and 
the contentious relations in Asia, a strong Japan-India defense agreement could bring 
stability or further antagonism, depending on how their neighbors view it. 
Democratization in Asia is another possible repercussion if Japan and India form 
enduring ties. Japan, with its experience during the Meiji restoration and the government 
formed after WWII, is Asia’s oldest democracy. India is Asia’s largest democracy with 
over 1.2 billion people in 2011.11 India and Japan each have influence in the region, and 
working together they have the potential ability to shape democratization movements. 
Conversely, a return to low-level contact between them could signal ambivalence toward 
democratic ideals. 
Both Japan and India are seeking to play a greater role in world politics as well. 
Japan and India, along with Brazil and Germany, have been pushing for reforms in the 
                                                 
9 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed 27 
May, 2014, http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expenditure+database+1988-2013.xlsx. 
10 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 95; Norman D. Levin, Mark Lorell, and Arthur Alexander, The Wary Warriors: Future 
Directions in Japanese Security Policies, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 59. 
11 Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 2011 Census (New Dehli: GPO, 2011), accessed Jun 
13, 2014, http://www.devinfolive.info/censusinfodashboard/. 
 4
United Nations (UN), including permanent seats on the UNSC for the four countries.12 
India has participated in UN missions for some time, and Japan has increased its 
involvement over the last decades.13 The growing role of Tokyo and New Delhi in world 
politics is quite visible in Southeast Asia. Japan, while long involved economically in the 
region, has been increasing its political and military role in the region since the 1970s. 
Beginning in 1992, India also began to be more involved in Southeast Asia when it 
adopted its Look East policy. This policy entailed increased interaction with the states in 
East Asia and the Pacific, with an initial focus on Southeast Asia; moreover, the focus 
was initially an economic one, but expanded to military and political participation as 
well.14 In this context, the global framework could change if a long-term Japan-India 
security relationship is established. 
The United States is also heavily involved in the region and is looking to become 
more involved with the pivot to Asia. The United States has maintained a long-lasting 
alliance with Japan and has agreements with other countries in the region, including 
South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The United States has been trying 
to build stronger ties with India as well. In March 2000, President Bill Clinton travelled 
to India and lifted economic sanctions placed on India after their nuclear weapons test in 
1998; four years later, the United States and India declared a strategic partnership.15 If 
Japan and India develop a strong defense relationship, the United States could either be 
drawn into conflicts or help create stability with the increasing interconnections within 
Asia. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Relatively few people outside of India and Japan have written much about the 
Japan-India relationship, and several of those who do are originally from one of these 
                                                 
12 Jain, "Westward Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," 20–21. 
13 Thakur, ed., Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1. 
14 David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 15, 202, 223. 
15 Kazutoshi Tamari, “Explaining the Similarity: Comparative Analysis of Japan and America’s India 
Policy,” in India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia, ed. Takenori Horimoto and Lalima Varma (New 
Delhi: Manohar, 2013), 160. 
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countries. Within India and Japan, however, the field is somewhat wider. The closest 
approximation to camps about what has caused the recent increased interaction between 
India and Japan are those in India, those in Japan, and those from the English-speaking 
world of England, Australia, and the United States. These groups tend to agree over what 
has driven Japan and India together as a whole, but seem to disagree over the relative 
importance of these drivers, the most common being the rise of China, U.S. influence, 
economic factors, nuclear proliferation, Japan and India’s greater involvement and 
importance in world and regional affairs, and maritime security. 
Those from the English-speaking world have focused on China, America, 
economics, and nuclear weapons. Each of them has cited China’s rise and a shared desire 
to avoid falling under a Chinese hegemonic shadow as driving Japan-India security 
cooperation. For example, Brewster states, “China looms large in the relationship” due to 
“mutual perceptions of a ‘China threat.’”16 Similarly, Pant wrote: “The rise of China is a 
major factor in the evolution of the Indo-Japanese ties.”17 
This group has also tended to focus on America’s encouragement of the growing 
ties. Brewster and Pant both describe American influence within Japan and India as equal 
to the rise of China in stimulating Japan-India relations.18 Green also argues that the 
United States plays a central role, as Japan’s movements have seemed to follow 
America’s and India’s often involve the U.S. when conducting exercises with Japan.19 
These analysts also see more than one issue that is getting in the way of stronger 
ties. The first problem that could hinder the growing Japan-India partnership is a lack of 
economic linkages. In 2009, Roehrig thought that both India and Japan’s strong economic 
ties with China could overshadow and stunt the “economically-anemic Japan-India 
                                                 
16 David Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring Security Partnership?," 
Asian Security 6, no. 2 (2010): 116, ProQuest (743038939). 
17 Harsh V. Pant, "India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China," Asia-Pacific 
Review 14, no. 1 (May, 2007): 66, ProQuest (59770156). 
18 Pant, “India in the Asia-Pacific,” 66; Brewster, “The India-Japan Security Relationship,” 116. 
19 Michael J. Green, “Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle with China,” in Strategic Asia 2011–12: 
Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (Seattle: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), Kindle edition, location 3189. 
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bilateral partnership” with its “top heavy security component.”20 The second mark on the 
negative side of the tally is their differing stance on nuclear weapons, including Green 
and Roehrig. While they see India’s nuclear weapons as a roadblock to Japan, the also 
see room for potential cooperation with India’s hope for a global disarmament regime.21 
The largest obstacle in this category of literature is the lack of recent discussion. 
Only one of the articles referenced above is from this decade, and that is Green’s article 
on the strategic triangle between Japan, India, and China.22 In early 2014, there was one 
piece written by Taylor Washburn in The National Interest, which was written shortly 
after India welcomed Prime Minister Abe to India and was in response to an Indian 
newspaper stating that India had no problem with Abe visiting the Yasukuni shrine.23  
The other American or European pieces from this decade are articles in the Wall Street 
Journal or Washington Post that highlight particular new developments.24 
While there has been little written outside, India and Japan have many more 
recent entries in the literature. While some of the discussion parallels the previous group, 
they also highlight different possible factors.  
Like the analysts residing outside India or Japan, a majority of Indian analysts 
who deal with Japan relations cite the rise of China as a major factor in promoting Japan-
India relations. One of these is Chellaney, who argues that China’s rise is further dividing 
Asia and that the Japan-India partnership has the potential to balance this effect, ensure 
                                                 
20 Terence Roehrig, "An Asian Triangle: India's Relationship with China and Japan," Asian Politics & 
Policy 1, no. 2 (April 2009): 177, ProQuest (818792221). 
21 Green, “Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle,” location 3140; Roehrig, “An Asian Triangle,” 
175–176. 
22 Green, “Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle,” location 2695–3228. 
23 Taylor Washburn, “India and Japan Draw Closer: Risks and Rewards,” National Interest (February 
19, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/india-japan-draw-closer-risks-rewards-9898. 
24 Harsh V. Pant, "Meeting the China Challenge: the U.S., Japan and India Confer on Security 
Concerns in Response to Rising Aggression from Beijing," Wall Street Journal, Dec 20, 2011, ProQuest 
(911740382); Santanu Choudhury,  "India and Japan Begin Joint Naval Exercises; Countries Look to 
Tighten Military Ties as both Face Territorial Disputes with China," Wall Street Journal, Dec 19, 2013, 
ProQuest (1469282473); Gordon Fairclough, "World News: In Japanese Visit to Delhi, A Message Goes 
Out to China," Wall Street Journal, Jan 27, 2014, Eastern edition, ProQuest (1491720469); Rama Lakshmi 
and Chico Harlan, "India, Japan Draw Closer, with an Eye on China," Washington Post, May 31, 2013, 
ProQuest (1356855453). 
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peace in Asia, and help bring the region together.25 In a similar vein, General Thakur of 
the Indian Army states that some in India have sought ties with Japan to balance China as 
early as the 1950s, or before the Sino-Indian War.26 
Instead of looking at U.S. influence, Indian writers have focused more on Japan’s 
increased global involvement and India’s rising global status and Look East policy. Paul 
believes that “Japan’s emergence as a ‘normal’ power” and Tokyo’s realization of India’s 
strategic location are two of the three driving factors, the other being China.27 Similarly, 
Ghosh sees Japan as moving from a merchant state to a normal state and expanding its 
navy’s influence.28 Kesavan, among others, looks to India’s economic growth and Look 
East policy as the reasons for increased India-Japan relations. 29 
Outside analysts looked at economics and nuclear cooperation as the biggest 
barriers, and while some authors in India see these as issues the biggest problem they 
identify is a lack of experience in each other’s cultures. Jaiswal and George argue that the 
lack of experience with the other’s culture is what has inhibited the establishment of 
lasting ties between Japan and India, instead of the lack of economic ties.30 
Most of the Japanese who wrote in English were contributing to compilations, and 
this tends to bring out alternate views to what has already been contributed. In this vein, 
while others have pointed to the rise of China, Ito argues: “it is readily apparent that 
overemphasizing the ‘China threat’ has not helped to deepen bilateral cooperation 
because of the different diplomatic and security situations;” India’s main issues with 
China are over Tibet, Kashmir, and its border issue while Japan is more worried about the 
                                                 
25 Brahma Chellaney, “Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia: Prospects of Japan-India Co-
Operation,” Observer Research Foundation Seminar Series 1, no. 2 (2008): 3, ProQuest (58817965). 
26 Thakur, Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations, xxi. 
27 Joshy M. Paul, "India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism," South Asian Survey 15, 
no. 1 (January 2008): 110–11, ProQuest (59857169). 
28 Madhuchhanda. Ghosh, "India and Japan's Growing Synergy." Asian Survey 48, no. 2 (March, 
2008): 282, ProQuest (59810260). 
29 K. V. Kesavan, “Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia: Prospects of Japan-India Co-
Operation,” Observer Research Foundation Seminar Series 1, no. 2 (2008): 12, ProQuest (58817965). 
30 Kesavan, “Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia,” 12; P. A. George, “Present Status of Japanese 
Studies in India: Prospects and Problems,” in India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia, 245–263. 
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Senkaku/Daioyu islands and Southeast Asia.31 In the same compilation, Tamari addresses 
the issue of American influence by arguing that while Japan and America have had 
similar policies toward India, it is due to their similar interests and not American 
guidance.32 
The view of nuclear cooperation in Japan appears conflicted. For example, 
Horimoto takes both sides. First, he argues, “one area of natural fit for Japan and India to 
explore is nuclear cooperation.”33 He then states that India’s nuclear weapons program 
prevents easy cooperation without “Japan’s abandonment of half a century of anti-nuclear 
advocacy.”34 
 The one contemporary driver that most Japanese experts have emphasized, even 
when discussing other factors, is the mutual interest of maritime security, comprising 
keeping the sea lines of communication open, supporting the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, and combatting piracy. Ito discusses the work against piracy, as 
does Horimoto when introducing the convergence of Japan and India’s strategic 
interests.35 
The literature base for Japan-India relations is growing rapidly, but still small in 
comparison to many and is mostly comprised of articles and compilations; furthermore, 
most of the literature comes from outside the United States. Many of these pieces have 
focused on the contemporary issues bringing Japan and India together or keeping them 
apart, with some discussing the benefits for Asia. Few have discussed whether these 
factors or the changes made will have an enduring impact, or delved into American 
interests in the relationship. There has also been little discussion on what domestic issues 
                                                 
31 Toru Ito, “‘China Threat’ Theory in Indo-Japan Relations,” in India-Japan Relations in Emerging 
Asia, 125. 
32 Kazutoshi Tamari, “Explaining the Similarity,” 169. 
33 Takenori Horimoto, “The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Agreement?,” Asia 
Pacific Bulletin, no. 107 (April 15, 2011), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/japan-india-nuclear-
agreement-enhancing-bilateral-agreement. 
34 Horimoto, “The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Agreement?” 
35 Ito, “‘China Threat’ Theory in Indo-Japan Relations,” 125; Takenori Horimoto, “Strategic 
Convergence of Japan-India Relations and China’s Emergence,” in India-Japan Relations in Emerging 
Asia, 25–26. 
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might be keeping them apart, except for Jaiswal and George’s argument about cultural 
awareness.  A principal function of this thesis is to fill these knowledge gaps.  
D. ROADMAP 
In order to answer the question of the enduring capability of Japan-India relations, 
it is first necessary to determine what factors have and have not had a role in driving 
Tokyo and New Delhi toward the current relationship. This thesis analyzes the various 
possible factors to determine their effect. These possible drivers have been divided into 
four categories, each assessed in a separate chapter: the effect of major world powers, 
Japan and India’s multilateral and bilateral engagement, the internal issues of Japan, and 
the internal issues of India. Throughout these chapters and the conclusion, this thesis will 
show that an increasing realist viewpoint and balance of power politics, coupled with 
regional factors and rising international participation by Japan and India, have led to the 
development of the current expansion of Japan-India relations. The final chapter will also 
discuss the likely enduring nature of India-Japan cooperation, and factors that could 
potentially derail this expectation.  
 10
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II. MAJOR WORLD POWERS 
According to Kenneth Waltz, states tend to create balances of power as they seek 
to ensure the preservation of their state in an anarchic system where no external help is 
guaranteed.36 This happens because no country operates in a vacuum; the actions of one 
country affect those around it and around the world. Moreover, the more powerful a 
country is, the greater its potential to influence those around it, and according to balance 
of power theory, the more likely other states are to try and balance that influence. China 
and the United States, with the largest economies and military budgets in the world, are 
major factors in these calculations. Russia, with its strong ties to India and territorial 
dispute with Japan in the Kuril Islands, could also be a major consideration; however, 
Moscow has not exerted much influence either way in the India-Japan relationship to 
date. Thus, this chapter looks at the affect that the great powers of China and the United 
States have on Japan-India relations primarily through balance of power concepts. 
A. CHINA: THE MIDDLE COUNTRY 
In December of 1978, Beijing enacted Gaige Kaifang, or “reform and opening 
up.”37 With that change, China began to grow economically, initiating what is called “the 
rice of China.” China currently has the world’s largest population, second largest 
economy, and second largest military budget, and can therefore have a large impact on 
those around it. In the case of Japan and India, the meaning of the Chinese characters for 
China, middle country, is fitting as well due to its location between the two. Initially, 
Japan and India took divergent views regarding China; however, with China’s growth 
and the changing security environment after the Cold War, India and Japan’s interests 
regarding China appear to have merged due to Beijing’s more assertive position and their 
desire to balance China’s rise. 
                                                 
36 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 118. 
37 Xiaodong Zhu, “Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present, and Future,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 26, no. 4 (2012): 110. 
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1. India 
India’s troubles with China start not long after India’s Independence. In 1950, 
China took control of Tibet, which India protested; it also lengthened the China-India 
border considerably. According to the Correlates of War Program (COW), there were 
eight different militarized events along the border in the 1950s, escalating from alerts and 
border fortifications to clashes at Longju and Kongka pass as border negotiations 
stalled.38 The border dispute remained unresolved and escalated further into the 1962 
Sino-Indian War where India’s troops were quickly routed and approximately 14,000 
square miles of territory was taken by China before Beijing declared a unilateral cease-
fire.39 The war did not resolve the border dispute for either side; China and India each 
claim territory that the other country controls, including Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin, 
and parts of Kashmir as seen in Figure 1. These claims span over 47,000 square miles, 
which is roughly the size of New York.40 After the war, Nehru stated: “Never forget that 
the basic challenge in South-East Asia is between India and China. That Challenge runs 
along the spine of Asia.”41 
                                                 
38 Glenn Palmer et al., “The MID4.01 Data Set, 2002–2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and 
Description,” last modified February 5, 2013, http://www.correlatesofwar.org; Neville Maxwell, “China 
and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute,” China Quarterly, no. 43 (1970): 60, 62. 
39 Sumit Ganguly, “Indian Defence Policy,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, eds. Niraja 
Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 544; Sumit Ganguly, 
Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2001), 37. 
40 Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our 
Next Decade, revised edition (Boston: Mariner Books, 2009), 32. 
41 Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in K. Subrahmanyam, “Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962,” in 
Indian Foreign Policy: the Nehru Years (New Delhi: Vikas , 1976), 107. 
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Figure 1.  “South Asian Territorial Claims”42  
The border has continued to be a point of contention between China and India. In 
the two decades after the war, COW reports 12 more disputes along the border, with four 
of them resulting in casualties.43 While the border incidents practically ceased for the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, they began increasing again in the twenty-first century. 
There were 3 militarized disputes in the first decade, culminating in an attempt by China 
to block India’s ability to conduct flood relief in Arunachal Pradesh and Chinese Army 
(PLA) troops operating in the same area.44 PLA troops have continued to enter Indian 
controlled Arunachal Pradesh since then and have even destroyed Indian military 
                                                 
42 “Fantasy Frontiers,” Economist, February 8, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/05/indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_disputes. 
43 Palmer et al., “The MID4.01 Data Set.” 
 44 M. Taylor Fravel, “China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences,” in 
Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and 
Jessica Keough (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), Kindle edition, location 1910.  
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outposts.45 Beijing has also increased infrastructure projects and PLA deployments in 
Chinese controlled Kashmir and Tibet.46  
Another source of contention has been at sea; some in India are concerned with 
China’s increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. For example, in early 2014 a PLA 
Navy nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) patrolled the Indian Ocean for several 
months; while Beijing reported it was there to protect sea-lines of communication 
(SLOC), it carried cruise missiles more suited for attacking land targets than mobile 
ships.47 China has also increased its maritime presence by building seaports in 
Myanmar/Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan among other locations, as seen in 
Figure 2. This line of ports, referred to as the string of pearls, has many in India feeling 
that China is attempting to encircle their country.48  
China’s support to Pakistan, particularly its nuclear program, is yet one more 
concern for India. In 1976, Zulfikar Bhutto gained assistance in uranium enrichment from 
China.49 In 1988, reports had emerged that China had supplied Pakistan with advanced 
warhead designs.50 A few years later U.S. intelligence leaked information that Pakistan 
had received ballistic missiles or components from China.51 
                                                 
45 “China Accused of Incursion in India’s Arunachal Pradesh,” BBC News, August 22, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-23790860; Harsh V. Pant, “India Comes to Terms with a 
Rising China,” in Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers, location 2441. 
 46 Brahma Chellaney, “Rising Powers, Rising Tensions: The Troubled China-India Relationship,” 
SAIS Review 32, no. 2 (2012): 102–03. 
47 Sandeep Unnithan, “Exclusive: Indian Navy Headless as Chinese Nuclear Sub Prowls Indian 
Ocean,” India Today, March 21, 2014, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-navy-chinese-nuclear-sub-
indian-ocean/1/350498.html. 
 48 Bill Emmott, Rivals, 54; Sam Chee Kong, “China’s String of Pearls Strategy: Why is the U.S. 
Afraid and How Does it Affect Us?,” Malaysia Chronicle, December 22, 2013, http://www.malaysia-
chronicle.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=201131:chinese-string-of-pearls-strategy-
complement-its-global-economic-domination#axzz2u4wRvxru. 
49 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1999), 196, 298, and 321. 
50 Ibid., 298. 
51 Ibid., 321. 
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Figure 2.  “String of Pearls”52  
To avoid being overwhelmed by China and its increasing influence, India has 
sought a balance through internal and external means. Internally, India increased military 
spending; the year after the war New Delhi doubled the defense budget and the trend of 
increased military budgets continued for decades after.53 More people in India also began 
to look at nuclear weapons after the war with China; the first formal demand for nuclear 
weapons from the Jana Sangh Party came after the Sino-Indian war in December of 
1962.54 After China’s nuclear test in 1964, even more interest was shown in obtaining 
nuclear weapons; for example, Sisir Gupta was concerned that China could “subject a 
non-nuclear India to periodic blackmail, weaken its people's spirit of resistance and self-
confidence, and thus achieve without a war its major political and military objectives in 
Asia.”55 While China’s nuclear program was not the only reason given, India authorized 
                                                 
52 R. S. Vasan, “China’s Maritime Ambitions: Implications for Regional Security,” The Sri Lanka 
Guardian, January 21, 2011, http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/01/chinas-maritime-ambitions-
implications.html. 
53 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 46. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Sumit Ganguly, “The Road to Pokhoran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear 
Weapons Program,” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 152. 
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its own nuclear program to increase research in defense applications just two years after 
China’s nuclear test; eight years later India conducted its first underground tests with a 
nuclear device.56 Externally, India looked for help around the globe. In 1962, New Delhi 
accepted aid from the United States to bring an end to the Sino-India war. Later it 
established its friendship with the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) based on 
their “mutual antipathy” toward China.57 After the USSR collapsed at the end of the Cold 
War, India initiated its Look East policy to search for economic and military allies that 
could take the place of the USSR in its security.58 Japan, as an advanced economy was 
one of many countries that India looked to when it looked east. 
2. Japan 
Japan and China share a long history of conflict going back centuries. Taro Aso, 
who later served as both foreign minister and prime minister of Japan, asked: “China and 
Japan have hated each other for a thousand years. Why should things be any different 
now?”59 More recently, there have been several political rows between them that focus 
on Japan’s WWII legacy; the Chinese feel that the “whitewashing” of Japan’s actions in 
WWII in textbooks and museums indicate that the Japanese have not sufficiently atoned 
for their actions.60 Beijing also cites visits by politicians to the Yasukuni shrine, which 
not only honors dead Japanese soldiers and sailors, but several class-A war criminals as 
well.61  
Despite this animosity, Japan and China had relatively peaceful relations for 50 
years after WWII. According to COW, Japan and China experienced 50 years with only 
three disputes militarized disputes after WWII, and all three were at the lowest 
                                                 
56 Ganguly, “Indian Defence Policy,” 546. 
57 K. P. S. Menon, “India and the Soviet Union,” in Indian Foreign Policy: the Nehru Years, 146. 
58 Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?, 202. 
59 Taro Aso, quoted in Bill Emmott, Rivals, 96. 
60 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 155. 




classification.62 Japan was also the first country in Asia to become a wealthy, modern 
country and did so decades well before its neighbors; as late as 1989, Japan’s GDP was 
still more than six times that of China’s.63 
This changed, however, in the last half of the 1990s. Tokyo watched as North 
Korea developed nuclear weapons and China grew economically and militarily, making 
some in Japan believe that Japan is less secure than it had been during the Cold War.64 
According to the COW, Japan and China had three militarized disputes from 1995 to 
1999, followed by seven in the first decade of the twenty-first century.65 Most of the 
military disputes are linked to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the exclusive 
economic zones in the East China Sea, and the oil beneath them as seen in Figure 3. The 
various incursions include Chinese SSN’s and destroyers sailing through the Tsugaru 
Strait between Hokkaido and Honshu, seen in Figure 4, or between the Ryukyu Islands of 
Okinawa and Miyako, seen in Figure 5.66 In 2003, the Japanese Coast Guard seized 
Chinese fishing vessels near the disputed islands, and in 2010 another Chinese fishing 
boat was seized after it rammed a Japanese Coast Guard patrol cutter.67 Then in 2013, 
China announced that it was expanding its Air Defense and Identification Zone to cover 
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, shown in Figure 3.68 
                                                 
62 Palmer et al., “The MID4.01 Data Set.” 
63 1989 Economic Statistics and Indicators, Economy Watch, last modified May 6, 2013, 
http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/year/1989/. 
64 Sharif Shuja, Japan’s Changing Security Policy: an Overall View (University of Maryland School 
of Law, 2006), 5. 
65 Palmer et al., “The MID4.01 Data Set.” 
66 David Brewster, “How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties,” BBC, April 24, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139; Emmott, Rivals, 95; Jonathan Holslag, Trapped 
Giant: China’s Military Rise (New York: Routledge, 2010), 77, 
http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/toc/tadl20/50/416#.Uyuyg2NOWM8. 
67 Palmer et al., “The MID4.01 Data Set”; Green, “Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle,” location 
2969. 
 68 Dongzhaohui ed., Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing 
the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, Ministry of National Defense The People’s Republic 




Figure 3.  East China Sea Dispute69  
 
Figure 4.  Tsugaru Strait70  
                                                 
69 “How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties,” BBC News, April 24, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139. 
70 Tsugaru Strait, Wikipedia, accessed April 4 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsugaru_Strait. 
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Figure 5.  Ryukyu Islands71  
Each of these incidents has increased tensions between the two states and appears 
to have moved many analysts and policy-makers in Japan toward more realist outlooks.  
According to Yutaka Kawashima, these changes have brought the “emergence of a new 
school of thought in Japan that stresses the importance of Japan having better relations 
with India or Russia as a counterforce to China.”72 This move toward realism also 
follows Michael Green’s premise that Japan has shifted from trying to establish an Asia 
centered on Japan and China, to forming ties in Asia to constrain China.73 Thus In 1997, 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Research Commission suggested that Japan go 
beyond strengthening the U.S. alliance and “strengthen [relations with] the cooperative 
countries, South Korea and Australia – nations which also have reason to be concerned 
                                                 
71 Ryukyu Islands, Factsanddetails.com, accessed September 10, 2014, 
http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat25/sub172/item957.html. 
72 Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the 
Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 12. 
73 Michael J. Green, Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 26. 
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about China’s future course.”74 Just a couple of years later, Japan began to reach out 
toward India with Prime Minister Mori’s visit to New Delhi. 
3. Arguments against Balancing China 
While there is a strong case for China’s rise being the driving force behind Japan 
and India’s growing connections, there are indications against it. For India, China is a 
fellow developing country; with India and China being the two largest such countries, 
there are instances where India’s interest align more closely with China than Japan; these 
include the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, World Trade 
Organization, and International Monetary Fund. India, however, has been willing to work 
with both China and Japan, based on the situation. Another cited misalignment is the lack 
a shared specific threat in China; instead, it is a just a vague threat where the relative 
threat perceptions do not align well.75 In this instance, the source of the threat remains the 
same; moreover, it fails to account for a closer alignment of interests in Southeast Asia. 
Economically, both countries are more connected to China than they are to each other. 
China became Japan’s number one trading partner in 2007, and now accounts for one-
fifth of Japan’s total trade volume.76 India is less dependent on Chinese trade, but still has 
strong economic ties to China; since 2003, India’s top three trading partners have been 
the United States, China, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with each making close to 
10 percent of India’s total trade.77 With these large trade balances, neither country may 
be willing to provoke China. While these issues may influence Tokyo and New Delhi’s 
calculations, there does not appear to be evidence that they have slowed or prevented 
Japan-India relations as the two continued to move closer through the beginning of the 
                                                 
74 Liberal Democratic Party Research Commission on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy of the Liberal 
Democratic Party – Part I: Japan’s Asia-Pacific Strategy: The Challenges of Transformation (Tokyo: 
Liberal Democratic Party, undated, released in English in May 1997), 23 quoted in Green, Reluctant 
Realism, 26. 
75 Ito, “‘China Threat’ Theory in Indo-Japan Relations,” 121–23. 
76 Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance, last modified August 2014, 
http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/srch/indexe.htm. 
77 Export Import Database, Government of India: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, last modified 
September 5, 2014, http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/Default.asp. 
 21
twenty-first century. Further, seeking to balance China’s influence does not equate to 
seeking to contain or oppose China. 
B. THE UNITED STATES: THE SOLE SUPERPOWER 
America’s influence on India-Japan relations has a very different quality than 
China’s influence. The United States does not share a border with either country, nor has 
it made any unwanted military incursions for decades. There are, however, several 
instances where Washington has brought Japan and India together. After the December 
2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the United States formed a response team with Japan, 
India, Australia, and the United States at its core; the inclusion of each was due not only 
to their capabilities, but also because Washington wanted to create an opportunity to 
work together and build stronger relations.78 While the Indian and Japanese navies had 
interacted before, they had not done so outside of exercises and meetings. The three 
countries have continued to work together at sea since that time, including various naval 
exercises and the trilateral talks that started in 2011. These talks have covered a variety of 
topics, including security and humanitarian aid in South and Southeast Asia and domestic 
issues for the three countries.79 While the United States has some influence in Japan-
India relations, the extent of that influence may be smaller or different than supposed in 
Washington. 
1. India 
America’s influence with India has historically been very small. For the first 40 
plus years after India’s independence, the two did not interact much or see eye to eye. 
The two countries were further divided by the Cold War with India looking to the USSR 
                                                 
78 Michael J. Green, Symposium on Japan and India: Challenges and Prospects in Asia and Pacific in 
the 21st Century, March 10, 2006, 21, 45–46, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/sympo0603.txt. 
79 Josh Rogin, “Inside the First Ever U.S.-Japan-India Trilateral Meeting,” Foreign Policy, December 
23, 2011, 
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g; Indrani Bagchi, “India-Japan-US Trilateral Talks on a Higher Plane,” Times of India, April 27, 2014, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Japan-US-trilateral-talks-on-a-higher-
plane/articleshow/34265657.cms; Amit Baruah, “India, Japan for Upgrading Trilateral Talks with U.S.,” 
Hindu, September 2, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-japan-for-upgrading-trilateral-
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 22
for weapons and support against China, and the United States’ decision to make Pakistan 
a part of its strategy against communism.80 With the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, India lost its supplier of weapons, balance against China, 
and major trading partner. At this time, India began a “rediscovery of America,” as it was 
in need of foreign investment, Western technology, and a new supplier of weapons.81  
With India’s growth and the change in world politics, New Delhi’s interests have 
aligned with those of the United States more often than before; however, Indian leaders 
are careful to define the growing relationship as a “selective partnership” and not a 
strategic alliance.82 Even with this distinction, U.S.-India relations have been growing. 
International trade between the two countries totals near $100 billion each year, and in 
2005 India and the United States signed a 10-year defense pact that includes exercises 
and exchanges.83 This agreement was recently extended for another 10 years, and 
expands cooperation in jointly develop military hardware.84 The relation has had 
struggles as well. For example, there was the arrest of Indian diplomat Devyani 
Khobragade in New York in December 2013 and India’s reprisal on a club at the U.S. 
embassy in New Delhi, as well as cries for an apology by the Indian people.85 But while 
the road has not been smooth, India and the United States are closer than they have been 
at any time since India’s independence. 
2. Japan 
Because of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the level of influence the United States has in 
Japan is much stronger than its influence in India. Some authors, like Purnendra Jain, 
                                                 
80 Menon, “India and the Soviet Union,” 146. 
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83 Sumit Ganguly, “Indian Defence Policy,” 542; Frank Jack Daniel and David Brunnstrom, “India 
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argue that Japan’s junior position in the alliance causes Japan to be reactive in strategic 
matters, responding to U.S. cues in its relationships with other countries.86 Under this 
logic, as the United States forged closer ties to India, Japan jumped on the bandwagon 
and followed Washington’s lead and encouragement.87 This logic gives a plausible 
reason for many of Japan’s actions toward India; Prime Minister Mori visited India five 
months after President Clinton, Tokyo lifted sanctions on India for their nuclear weapons 
test one month after Washington, and declared their strategic partnership with India three 
years after the United States.88 It does not, however, explain the lack of a nuclear 
agreement, even after Japan began nuclear cooperation talks with India over four years 
ago. Another argument by Kazutoshi Tamari posits that the similarities come from the 
United States and Japan’s common interests while Japan learns from the example of other 
countries, including the United States.89 This argument better describes the security 
cooperation and attempts to account for the differences in nuclear policy.  
Neither argument, however, adequately addresses other points of Japan-India 
relations. First, Japan and India’s 2000 Coast Guard agreement not only happened five 
years before the U.S.-India Defense Relationship but also before the majority of defense 
cooperation agreements India has established.90 Second, in 2011 Japan and India signed 
the CEPA, a trade agreement that is a first for India in scope.91 Japan and India have also 
been proactive in elements of their combined relationship with the United States. In 2007, 
Japan hosted a trilateral maritime exercise between Japan India, and the United States.92 
That same year, India invited Japan to participate in the Malabar exercise, a multilateral 
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exercise between India, the United States, and other regional countries.93 Japan 
participated in the Malabar exercises in 2007 and 2009 and has agreed to participate in 
the next exercises in 2015.94 Prime Minister Abe also suggested a quadrilateral forum 
with Japan, India, Australia, and the United States; however, this forum failed to 
materialize due to Chinese protests and lack of interest in antagonizing China.95 In each 
of these cases, Japan and India moved ahead of any lead or example of any country, 
including the United States. 
A third argument is that instead of encouragement from the United States, it is a 
declining America that is influencing Japan. As Michael Green highlights, Japan had 
nowhere to go for help with their security at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
besides the United States.96 As the century started, Tokyo could see that there were limits 
to U.S. power as the U.S. military became involved in Afghanistan and Iraq while being 
restricted in its options regarding North Korea; this reality imposed subsequent limits as 
to how much Japan could rely on American security guarantees in the future.97 Thus, in 
the words of Purnendra Jain, “Tokyo sees that Japan now has no choice; it must engage 
new security partners since its principle defender, the U.S., may be unable to live up to 
the guarantees that it could earlier fulfill.”98 Another concern for Japan comes when 
America has occasionally moved closer to China, leaving Japan wondering whom 
America would side with in a crisis.99 With these two issues, Japan may have increased 
incentives to look for other countries that can come to Japan’s aid if the need arises. It has 
not, however, led Japan to distance itself from the United States. 
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The United States has participated in the growing Japan-India relations, through 
naval exercises, trilateral talks, and possibly through its move toward India while being a 
strong ally of Japan. Instead of simply following America’s lead, however, Tokyo and 
India appear to be forging their own path, while willing to involve Washington when it 
suits them. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Kautilya, an Indian philosopher who lived 2300 years ago, said: “Your neighbor 
is your natural enemy and your neighbor’s neighbor is your friend.”100 While Nehru and 
Yoshida may have started their countries down paths that did not follow this realist 
framework, Japan and India have begun to adopt it anyway. At least since the Sino-Indian 
war, India has worked to maintain a balance with China, whether through its nuclear 
program, treaty with Russia, or more recently with its Look East policy with Japan and 
others. In the East, Japan has also begun to adopt a more realist stance as it looks to 
balance against a regionally hegemonic China. The United States, while not irrelevant, 
has had less impact on the relationship between Japan and India. For India, the United 
States is another possible balancer vis-à-vis China; however they are careful to not 
antagonize China or lose their autonomy to an alliance. Japan, while allied to the United 
States that is courting India, has also pursued an independent policy with India. 
This chapter finds solid support for balance-of-power explanations for the recent 
strengthening of India-Japan relations.  Other types of driving forces, however, may 
support or hinder these geostrategic factors.  In particular, other forces may strongly 
influence whether recent strengthening will be enduring or transient.  The following 
chapters assess other such types of influences. 
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III. MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL INFLUENCES 
Ajeet Jaiswal, while hopeful for growing Japan-India ties, feels that “India and 
Japan should as mature nations, find their own reasons for ... an ‘all-weather’ partnership, 
instead of relying on the U.S. to egg them on or on China to scare them into one.”101 The 
variety of international institutions and bilateral relations in which both countries may 
participate has the potential to be India’s and Japan’s “own reasons.” Maritime security, 
ASEAN and its forums, UNSC reforms, the nonproliferation regime, economic relations, 
and cultural ties all have had the potential to bring them together or keep them apart. This 
chapter discusses the effect, or lack thereof, of each of these forums for interaction on the 
growing Japan-India relationship. 
A. MARITIME SECURITY 
Beyond the coaxing and scaring of the major powers that Jaiswal comments on, 
maritime security is the most discussed element of Japan-India relations. Perhaps this is 
not too surprising, considering that maritime security has been one of the more consistent 
elements of the Japan-India relationship; at almost every meeting, the Prime Ministers of 
each country emphasize its prominence within the growing relationship.102 Maritime 
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security is also a natural fit, as each country considers itself a maritime country and relies 
heavily on traffic through the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. 
This maritime focus makes sense for both countries. 80–85 percent of India’s 
international trade is conducted by sea, with over 50 percent traveling through the Straits 
of Malacca.103 As an island, basically all of Japan’s foreign trade is conducted by sea; 
moreover, 80 percent of Japan’s oil and 20 percent of ships travelling to Japan sail 
through the same straits.104 These straits, along with other waters in Southeast Asia, have 
been a hotspot for piracy throughout history.105 In the 1990s, however, piracy began to 
increase in frequency, and by 2003 the International Maritime Bureau-Piracy Reporting 
Center reported 172 piracy attacks in Southeast Asia.106 Because of the many small 
islands at the Southeast entrance of the Malacca Strait, there are multiple places where 
the passage becomes less than one mile wide.107 These small passages funnel ships to 
locations where pirates can almost always find targets; they are also so narrow that a 
damaged ship can close some of these passages and restrict the flow of traffic. Since a 
trip that avoids the Malacca Straits adds approximately 1,000 miles to voyages between 
the East China Sea and Indian Ocean, the straits are quite important.108 
The piracy in the South China Sea impacts both countries and may have helped 
jumpstart the India-Japan relationship. In 1999, The Indian Navy and Coast Guard 
recovered the Japanese merchant ship, MV Alondra Rainbow, which had been hijacked in 
the Malacca Strait.109 The first anti-piracy exercise between Japan and India’s Coast 
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Guards took place just one year later, soon after Prime Minister Mori’s visit to New 
Delhi.110 Since this time, the Coast Guards of Japan and India have conducted bilateral 
exercises almost every year. Both are also involved in the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 
which was started in 2006 based of Prime Minister Koizumi’s 2001 anti-piracy proposal. 
While maintaining the SLOC and fighting piracy have been the primary focus, 
concerns over China appear beneath the surface. As seen previously, Japan and India are 
concerned over Chinese actions at sea, as are other nations in the area. In a secret 
memorandum, China stated that they were working to consolidate power in the Indian 
Ocean and South China Sea.111 Thus with China becoming increasingly aggressive in the 
South China Sea, many ASEAN states have begun to “look to the Indian navy as a 
potential counterweight to China.”112 For example, in 2012, both Vietnam and the 
Philippines asked India for explicit support against China in their territorial dispute.113 
Some of these same countries are believed to have encouraged Japan’s antipiracy projects 
in the South China Sea “to engage Japan as a potential naval power in the region to 
counter China’s influence.”114  While China may not the only factor in Japan, India, and 
some ASEAN member’s maritime security calculations, it does appear that it is a major 
component for some of them.  
B. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) 
India and Japan share more than an interest in combating piracy in Southeast 
Asia, they also both deal with ASEAN, its member nations, and its various multilateral 
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forums. This interaction with Southeast Asia and its forums began separately for both 
states and at different times, but they have gained more common ground in the region as 
time has passed. 
Japan has been involved in Southeast Asia and ASEAN for decades, and with 
India’s Look East policy New Delhi has become increasingly involved in the region as 
well. India became a dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1994, two years later India joined 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and in 2005 the East Asia Summit (EAS) was 
created with India as a member.115 India is also part of the Shangri-La dialogue and 
ASEAN Defense Ministers +8 meeting.116  
Japan-India cooperation in ASEAN has taken several forms, including working 
together in development projects and the previously mentioned maritime security. 
Japanese encouragement also helped India join the ARF; Japan was also insistent that 
India, along with Australia and New Zealand part of the EAS from the start.117  
Another country involved in ASEAN is China, and like maritime security several 
analysts, including Harsh Pant, Chien-Peng Chung, and Purnendra Jain, have cited 
Japan’s desire to counter China’s influence as the motivating factor in Tokyo’s lobbying 
for Indian membership in ASEAN related forums.118 At the symposium “Building an 
East Asian Community,” three reasons were given for Japan to want India in these 
forums: first, India’s large economic potential in East Asia; second, maritime security and 
India’s strategic location for maintaining the SLOC; and third, maintaining a balance in 
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the region.119 Like the maritime security realm, while Japan and India may not be 
opposing China and have other interests in cooperation, balancing China does appear to 
be a factor in their increased involvement and cooperation in ASEAN’s various forums. 
C. UNSC REFORMS 
Another multilateral cause on which Japan and India find themselves together is 
reforming the UNSC and gaining permanent seats. These two countries joined with 
Germany and Brazil in a coalition called the G-4 in an effort to strengthen their 
positions.120 While this common goal can bring India and Japan together, there are limits 
to how close it can bring them.  
First, UNSC reform is a limited goal that does not require broad connections 
between the two countries. For instance, Japan’s relations with Germany and Brazil, the 
other two countries in the G-4, are limited to economic and research ties that have existed 
for decades.121 A second limiting factor for UNSC reforms in bringing Japan and India 
together is that if the G-4 achieves their goal, there will be no further cause for these four 
countries to maintain their special pact as they join the current five permanent members 
of the security council. 
There is also the problem created by a low probability of quick success. While 
this does mean that Japan, India, Brazil, and Germany will be working together for some 
time to come, it can also generate friction between the countries caused by the lack of 
progress. The low likelihood of success and the potential for friction come from the 
various hurdles to cross in achieving UNSC reform. First, various plans have been 
proposed to deal with the veto power, how regions and states of different sizes will be 
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represented, and new categories of nonpermanent seats.122 These issues have been raised 
for over a decade and still no solution has been accepted. Second, as former Indian 
Ambassador to the UN Arundhati Ghosh pointed out, there are various rivalries that will 
lead countries to vote against their rivals gaining power, including “India-Pakistan, India-
China, Germany-Italy, Brazil-Mexico-Argentina, South-Africa-Nigeria-Egypt,” Japan-
China, and Japan-South Korea.123 China’s inclusion in these rivalries adds another 
wrinkle for both Japan and India; all five permanent members of the Security Council, 
including China, will have to agree to any reforms.124 China is not likely to give their 
support for several reasons, but primarily because China would lose its status as the only 
Asian UNSC permanent member.125 While the four countries of the G-4 have maintained 
solidarity so far, China’s hardline stance, particularly against Japan’s permanent 
membership in the UNSC, could lead to a division within the G-4 if the others look for 
greater support from China.126 
While UNSC reform is a common platform for India and Japan, the low level of 
interaction required, the lack of a mission beyond reform, and the low probability of 
success all form barriers to building a lasting relationship upon it. China’s veto vote again 
brings China into the mix, and in a way that could cause strife between the G-4 countries, 
rather than becoming a common opponent in the reform debate. 
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D. NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) AND COMPREHENSIVE TEST 
BAN TREATY (CTBT) 
Unlike the previous multilateral connections, Japan and India have not seen eye to 
eye on the nonproliferation regime. Japan is a supporter of both the NPT and the CTBT, 
while India has refused to sign either treaty. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests 
in 1998, Japan undertook several initiatives against India and Pakistan, including cutting 
off aid, meetings, and seeking multilateral action. Since then, India has not eliminated its 
nuclear weapons and has continued to develop its nuclear weapons program while Japan 
has continued to support the nonproliferation regime, yet Japan and India have moved 
from estrangement to global partners.  
One possible reason is that Japan and India’s positions are not as far apart as they 
appear. Initially, Japan and India supported nonproliferation and disarmament; at one 
point they also both opposed the NPT. For decades, India has both developed its nuclear 
program and attempted to gain support for a comprehensive nuclear disarmament; its 
stated problem with the NPT is the discriminatory nature towards non-nuclear states and 
the lack of a plan for disarmament.127 For example, Rajiv Gandhi tried to gain support for 
disarmament while simultaneously increasing funding for nuclear and military 
research.128  
Japan took two years to sign the NPT, but did not ratify it for another six years. 
Publicly, Japan stated that it would not ratify the treaty until the nuclear powers took 
steps towards disarmament while declassified documents state that ratification was 
delayed to avoid upsetting members of the LDP wanted to Japan to go nuclear.129 Since 
then, various Japanese leaders have made statements concerning Japan’s capability to go 
nuclear; recently Ichiro Ozawa told Chinese leaders that Japan was capable of creating 
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three to four thousand warheads while Yasuo Fukuda and the current Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe have restated that nuclear weapons do not violate Japan’s constitution.130  
This argument, however, overstates Japan’s move towards nuclear weapons. 
When politicians have gone beyond “can” and suggest that Japan “should” go nuclear, 
popular support declines and they can be dismissed like Shingo Nishimura was after 
stating that the lack of nuclear weapons has left Japan vulnerable to “rape” by nuclear 
powers.131 It also does not explain Japan’s unanimous resolution condemning India’s 
detonation of a nuclear device in 1974, the ratification of the NPT two years after India’s 
nuclear 1974 nuclear test, or Japan’s actions in 1998: recalling its ambassador; calling an 
emergency UNSC meeting using the nonpermanent seat it currently held; attempting to 
push resolutions in the UN, UNSC, G–8 summit, and ARF; establishing the “Emergency 
Action Forum on Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation”; and cutting off 133 
billion yen in loans and 3.5 billion yen in grants.132  
Another argument is that Japan has adopted a more realist framework 
internationally. After Japan took action against India and Pakistan, it found that few 
countries were willing to lend their support. For example, China, France, Russia, and the 
United Kingdom all refused to enact unilateral sanctions or support sanctions in the UN; 
ASEAN chose not to get involved as well, stating: “We’ll leave it to some other braver 
country.”133 Japan’s attempt to use multilateral institutions to prevent proliferation in 
South Asia had failed. At the same time, Japan’s security situation was changing. After 
almost twenty years without any militarized disputes with China or South Korea, and 
over fifteen years with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the situation had 
changed. In the mid to late 1990s, Japan watched China begin to conduct exercises in 
near the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, test nuclear weapons, and take a more provocative 
stance towards Japan while South Korea began to enforce its claim on the 
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Dokdo/Takeshima islands and the surrounding waters.134 Months after Japan began 
pursuing action against India, North Korea fired a Taepodong–1 missile over Japan.135 
The following years Japan dealt with multiple skirmishes with DPRK ships in Japanese 
waters.136 Fears that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons also spread during 
this time after the DPRK left the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1994.137 Under 
the realist argument, the combination of multilateral failure and increasing security 
threats caused Japan to reassess its position on India’s nuclear weapons. This scenario 
accounts for the change in perception and policy over time, as well as other actions 
discussed previously that brought Japan and India together. 
E. ECONOMIC TIES 
In their annual meetings, the prime ministers of Japan and India have repeatedly 
touted the growing economic ties between their two countries as another pillar in their 
“strategic and global partnership.” These rosy statements, however, do not always match 
what is going on.138 More than one author has described the economic relations between 
Tokyo and New Delhi as “anemic,” and Madhuchanda Ghosh argues that “the relative 
paucity of (and asymmetry in) their economic ties” is an obstacle to achieving “a truly 
‘strategic’ relationship.”139 The paucity can be seen in both the numbers and the kinds of 
commodities being traded, yet Japan and India have continued to move closer during the 
twenty-first century. 
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Most of the numbers appear to be heading in the wrong direction for those in 
Tokyo and New Delhi who want to see strong economic relations. Before WWII, India 
accounted for 10-15 percent of Japan’s foreign trade.140 After the war, Japan used Indian 
iron-ore to rebuild its economy and India was the first recipient of Japanese ODA in 
1958.141 The divide of the Cold War and India’s pursuit of import substitution stunted 
this relationship, even as parties in each country wanted greater ties.142 At the end of the 
Cold War, India began to liberalize its economy and Look East but the numbers 
continued to drop off. In the early 1990s India accounted for less than one percent of 
Japan’s foreign trade while Japan was India’s second biggest trading partner at 9 percent 
of India’s trade.143 Even after Prime Minister Mori’s visit, the numbers continued to 
drop; the percentage of foreign imports and exports for India with Japan dropped from 
five percent when he visited to two percent in 2013.144 While the numbers for Japan were 
not falling, they were also not really moving; the percentage of imports into Japan that 
came from India hovered around .7 percent while exports increased to just over one 
percent in the same timespan.145 In 2008, Prime Ministers Aso and Singh stated they 
expected total trade between the two countries to reach $20 billion by 2010; the actual 
number was just over half.146 
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Beyond the low trade quantity, the trade between India and Japan has also had a 
commensurate low quality. India’s primary exports to Japan are mineral fuels, oils, and 
waxes; iron and steel; and “residues and waste from the food industries” while Japan’s 
primary exports have been machinery components like boilers, marine products, jewels, 
and iron and steel.147 These areas do not reflect the new strengths of the Indian economy, 
nor do they build off each other’s strengths.148 For example, India has developed a 
reputation as an information technology (IT) power and Japan’s IT market is the second 
largest in the world; however, India’s slice of that market is only .57 percent and Indian 
companies have had problems getting into the Japanese market.149 
There are brighter points in the economic ties of Japan and India. The number of 
Japanese companies investing in India has been steadily rising from 248 in 2006 to 812 in 
2011; moreover, these companies represent an increasingly diverse set of businesses, 
including pharmaceuticals and electronics.150 Also, the governments of India and Japan 
signed the CEPA in 2011. This agreement, only the third such agreement India has made, 
is also the most comprehensive economic agreement India has agreed to; through it tariffs 
on over 90 percent of goods traded between the two countries will be reduced or 
eliminated within 10 years of its signing.151 It also institutes changes that will open up 
the markets where the countries have previously been reluctant to do so, like generic 
medicines in Japan.152 While there have not been any large shifts in trade since, the 
CEPA was signed, many of the provisions have yet to come into full effect and its full 
effect will come years in the future. 
Even in economic considerations, China shows up in the calculations. China 
became Japan’s number one trading partner in 2007, and now accounts for one-fifth of 
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Japan’s total trade volume.153 India is less dependent on Chinese trade, but still has 
strong economic ties to China. Since 2003, India’s top three trading partners have been 
the United States, China, and the United Arab Emirates with each making close to 10 
percent of India’s total trade.154 China is also the source of almost all of Japan’s rare 
earth metals, used in anything with a computer chip. In 2010, China cut off shipments of 
rare earth metals to Japan after Japan imprisoned the fishing captain who rammed a 
Japanese Coast Guard cutter. Since that time, Japan has been seeking alternative sources 
of rare earth metals, including India, Australia, Kazakhstan, and Malaysia with the 
intention of importing less than 40 percent from China.155 
F. CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING 
Cultural connections, like economic ties, have the potential to bring countries 
closer. Ajeet Jaiswal states, “India and Japan are no more natural allies than are India and 
China, if they do not learn to interact more at the people to people level.” 156 He then 
adds that “a long-term relationship cannot be sustained if India and Japan do not first 
understand each other.”157 A lack of understanding has persisted due to several issues, 
including historical context and lack of educational opportunities; however, the lack has 
not kept Japan and India apart. 
There is no large number of expatriates from either country in the other.158 There 
are also fewer lower level interactions. To illustrate this paucity, Makoto Kojima 
compares the numbers to those of Japan-China interactions, as seen in Table 1. The study 
of each other’s cultures is also low. Japanese studies in India, which were started in the 
1920s and resumed in 1952, lacked a large number of students because there were few 
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jobs available.159 While India doubled the number of students learning to speak Japanese 
from 2005 to 2010, the study of Japan beyond language has remained stagnant.160 The 
situation is similar in Japan; Tokyo University of Foreign Studies is one of a handful of 
universities in Japan that teach Hindi or India area studies.161 One of the oldest programs 
for contemporary India studies in Japan was started in 2009 at Tokyo University; most of 
the remaining programs were started one year later in conjunction with Tokyo 
University’s program.162 
Table 1.   Human Exchanges Among Japan, India and China163 
Categories  







No. of Japanese Visitors (2009) 124,219 3,317,500 1:27
No. of Foreign Visitors to Japan (2010) 66,900 1,427,100 1:21
Students in Japan (May 2010) 546 86,173 1:158
No. of Japanese Residents (2009) 4, 018 127,282 1:32
No. of People Learning Japanese Language 
(2009) 
18,000 827,000 1:48
Sister/Friendship Cities 5 pairs 337 pairs 1:67
No. of Direct Flights (Summer 2010: Airliners) 17 per week 556 per week 1:32
 
The lack of strong economic or cultural connections is concerning to some, like 
Ghosh, Jaiswal, and Kojima; however, New Delhi and Tokyo have been able to continue 
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working together without these connections. While economic or cultural ties may bring 
Japan and India closer together, their absence has not kept the two apart. 
G. CONCLUSION 
In the liberal framework of international relations, trade and international 
institutions like ReCAAP, ASEAN, the UN, and others can create incentives for 
cooperation and reduce the competitive nature and uncertainty inherent in anarchy.164 In 
the Case of Japan-India relations, there are several of these types of interactions that have 
the potential to bring them together or keep them apart. This chapter’s survey of a 
number of such forums for interaction has found that evidence points to an ambivalent 
influence. Japan’s strong backing of the nonproliferation regime, and the lack of trade 
and cultural interaction, all point to weaker ties. Other multilateral goals, like UNSC 
reform, may give the two states a commonality, but don’t lend themselves to the large 
increase in cooperation across spheres. Finally, while institutions like ReCAAP and 
ASEAN can open up countries across a variety of arenas, balance of power politics can 
be seen in within these organizations.  Thus, common participation in cooperative 
international forums and institutions does not appear to be a strong independent driver of 
strengthening India-Japan relations; nor has the absence of cooperation been a significant 
impediment. 
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IV. JAPAN AND THE LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II 
Just as external forces have the potential to foster or hinder Japan-India relations, 
domestic factors have the same potential. A variety of issues, some of which have no 
direct bearing on international relations, can and do exert influence on countries 
throughout the world. For Japan, many of the issues that affect its international relations, 
with India and others, come from the legacy of WWII.  While not an exhaustive list, this 
chapter discusses several Japanese domestic factors that have the potential to promote or 
inhibit sustained relations between Japan and India. 
A. FACTORS THAT CAN PROMOTE SUSTAINED RELATIONS 
After Commodore Perry arrived in Edo bay in 1853, Japan embarked on the 
process that would become known as the Meiji Restoration.165 In the 1860s and ’70s, 
hundreds of Japanese traveled abroad to learn about the West, and by the turn of the 
century, Japan was involved in international politics with signing new treaties, fighting 
wars, and being part of multilateral institutions like the League of Nations.166 Japan 
experienced growing nationalism during the Meiji Restoration and up to WWII as well in 
response to the humiliation felt from the unequal treaties and the success Japan had in 
modernizing.167 At the end of WWII, the Japanese receded from both international 
involvement and nationalism; however, both have been growing again in new ways that, 
along with the focus of some Prime Ministers, can strengthen Japan’s ties with India. 
1. International Involvement 
Following Japan’s defeat in WWII and a period of political maneuvering that 
followed, Prime Minister Yoshida and his successors in the LDP consolidated their 
control.168 As a result, the Yoshida Doctrine became the center of Japanese foreign 
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policy, which called for limited increases in defense spending and maintaining a small 
profile in international politics.169 Over the past decades, however, Japan has become 
increasingly involved internationally; moreover, this involvement has expanded both in 
variety and geographically. 
Initially, Japan’s involvement in the world was almost entirely through its 
economy. Even in countries close to Japan, like those in Southeast Asia, Japan avoided 
involvement outside of its “economic diplomacy.”170 When the United States put 
pressure on Japan to be more involved in the 1970s, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda 
responded by promising economic and political involvement, but he refused to take an 
active military role.171 With riots in several ASEAN states in 1974, Japan did begin 
increasing its interaction beyond the economic realm; by 1977, Japan had adopted the 
Fukuda doctrine that equal partnerships with ASEAN states in the political and security 
realms.172 In 1993, Japan expanded to Africa with the Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD). Since that time Japan has invested in Africa’s 
infrastructure, education, sanitation, and more, as seen in Figure 6. As Tokyo expanded 
its international involvement, it established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 
1997 to enable a more comprehensive approach to international affairs.173 
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Figure 6.  Composition of Japan’s ODA to African Countries174  
As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Fukuda refused to expand Japan’s military 
role, which left Japan unprepared to meet the rapidly changing international environment 
after the Cold War. During Desert Storm, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) deemed 
sending any forces, even for the purpose of rescuing refugees, as beyond the limits of 
Article 9, and by the time the issue had been resolved, the conflict was over.175 Many in 
the international community “vilified” Japan for this lack of physical support, and it “left 
the bitter taste of far too little, far too late” in Tokyo.176 In response, Japan passed the 
“Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
Operations,” allowing it to cooperate in future endeavors and prevent a similar gaffe.177 
Just after this law passed, Japan sent 1,800 troops to Cambodia as part of a UN 
peacekeeping force.178 Since that time, Japan has expanded the area and missions that the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) has participated in, as well as the scope of 
operations under its treaty with the United States, as seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  “Expansion of the JSDF geographical Range of Dispatch”179  
As Japan has become more involved, it has looked for partners with experience to 
work with in these various endeavors in order to be more successful.180 With Japan’s 
entry into peacekeeping and similar missions, India has the potential to be one of these 
partners, due to its experience in these missions. India has sent troops to 23 different 
countries on UN missions and is one of the highest contributors of forces.181 Japan can, 
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however, also work with the United States where the militaries already have strong 
working relations and more fully compatible equipment. Moreover, Japan has yet to 
create strong relations between the land component of the JSDF and the Indian Army. 
Japan’s growing presence in the region and internationally has brought increasing 
contacts with several countries. India, with its large population, democratic government, 
expanding economy, and strategic location, has become one of these countries; however, 
Japan’s increasing participation did not bring the two together on its own. 
2. Growing Nationalism 
Japan’s growing nationalism, like its growing international involvement, has the 
potential to increase its interaction with India. At first glance, this may seem 
counterintuitive; nationalism is an exclusionary concept that defines a group by what they 
have in common in contrast to other groups.182 For Japan, however, there are at least two 
reasons that nationalism can bring Japan and India closer together: pride in their 
country’s accomplishments and the historical issue that threatens relations with China 
and Korea. 
After WWII, Japan had to rebuild much of the country; as Jennifer Lind points 
out: “Japan was able to rise up from utter devastation and transform itself into one of the 
wealthiest, most stable, most technologically advanced, and most creative countries in the 
world.”183 In the 1960s, Japan had such a pollution problem that several pollution-related 
diseases have Japanese names; today, the World Health Organization states that Japan’s 
cities are among the least polluted in the world.184 These achievements have led many in 
Japan to look outward to promote similar results in other countries, and can be seen in the 
ODA to India, Africa, and elsewhere. Thus the pride in their achievements has led to part 
of Japan’s expanding international involvement. 
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Another element of nationalism in Japan that is not so rosy is the “history 
problem.”185 During WWII, Japan colonized, repressed, and conscripted their neighbors, 
forced women to provide sex for Japanese soldiers; massacred cities; and starved, abused, 
enslaved, and conducted medical experiments on their prisoners.186 Today, the problem 
is that Japan’s neighbors, specifically Korea and China, do not feel that Japan has either 
shown true remorse or sufficiently atoned for these atrocities; a feeling that is 
compounded when Japanese leaders state that these events did not happen or were not 
carried out by the Japanese government.187 Further compounding these problems is 
Japan’s territorial disputes with each of these governments. Thus even as Japan’s 
neighbors have grown more vocal on these issues, they have also become more vocal and 
active in asserting their claims. 
 In contrast, India is a country without these complications. As Harsh Pant says, 
there is no “historical baggage” between Japan and India.188 Instead, there are small 
elements of the past where Japanese see India in a positive light. For example, 
Radhabinod Pal served as India’s judge during the war trials; he was the only dissenting 
judge who argued that Japan’s actions were no worse than the victors’ and believed the 
war crimes trials were a way of obtaining revenge.189 A monument to the Judge Pal 
stands outside the contentious Yasukuni Shrine, and during Prime Minister Abe’s 2007 
trip to India, he traveled to Calcutta to visit the Judge’s son.190 While in Calcutta, he also 
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visited a monument to Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore, who visited Japan in the 
19th century.191 
The presence of historical animosities has affected international relations in the 
region. For example, while South Korea also has to contend with China’s rise and a 
North Korean regime that is pursuing nuclear weapons and antagonistic behavior toward 
both Japan and South Korea, the two nations have been unable to work closely together. 
Other countries have, however, looked beyond the historical problems; leaders in the 
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have all moved from being wary of 
increased Japanese military use to welcoming it.192 Likewise former Singapore President 
Lee Kuan Yew at one point likened having Japan take part in military action to “giving 
liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic,” but later adopted the opinion that there was no reason 
to fear Japanese militarism so long as the current international system continues.193  
Ultimately, however, although lack of historical animosity does make it easier for 
Japan and India to work together, it does seem to be insufficient to drive Japan and India 
together on its own. 
3. Leadership 
A third factor from within Japan that has brought it closer to India has been the 
various prime ministers. Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India was the first visit by a 
Japanese Prime Minister in 10 years, and since 2005, Japan’s Prime Minister has met 
with India’s Prime Minister every year.194 Among these meetings, there are a few points 
of note. 
Prime Minister Mori called India and Japan “global partners,” a phrase previously 
reserved for the United States, as he started to create a relationship beyond the nuclear 
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problem.195 In 2009, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won control of Japan’s 
government, they did not change tack; instead, Prime Minister Hatoyama visited India 
early in his tenure and “discussed ways to expand, enhance and strengthen the India–
Japan Strategic and Global Partnership.”196 
No Japanese Prime Minister has pushed for the Japan-India connection more than 
Shinzo Abe. As noted previously, he has travelled parts of India and honored people from 
India’s past. Abe was allowed to address a joint session of the Indian Parliament, an 
honor that not even President Bush or Chinese General Secretary Hu Jintao were 
given.197 In his book Utsukushii Kuni e (Towards a Beautiful Country), he wrote that 
India was important for Japan’s future and that Japan’s relations with China and the U.S. 
would be overtaken by its relationship with India.198 While this has not happened as 
quickly as he supposed, it is not because of a lack of effort on his part. For example, the 
CEPA that went into effect was started during Abe’s first term as Prime Minister.199 
More recently, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko visited India, marking the first 
visit to India by a Japanese Emperor; this visit was advised by Prime Minister Abe and 
could signal an even stronger emphasis to come.200 Abe has also known Narendra Modi 
since 2007 and “has long been a favorite” of Abe.201 With the election of Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi in India, the two could be positioned to further increase and cement the 
relationship between their two countries.  
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When Abe left office the first time, Japan-India relations did not regress or 
stagnate, but the relation’s progress did slow considerably. While Abe’s second tenure in 
office continues, Japan-India relations should continue to grow; however, Abe’s current 
tenure is already longer than those of every Prime Minister since Koizumi, including 
Abe’s previous term.202 When he leaves office, the priority his successor attaches to 
Japan-India relations could easily change. But all previous prime ministers since Mori, of 
both the LDP and DPJ, have supported some level of continued strengthening of 
relations.  If these tendencies continue, relations are not likely to go off track without 
some other input.  
B. FACTORS THAT CAN INHIBIT SUSTAINED RELATIONS 
Beyond the decline in nationalism and Japan’s involvement in world affairs, 
WWII left Japan another legacy that can hinder their defense relations with most 
countries including India. That legacy is the pacifism that Japan adopted at the end of the 
war, which sets a limit to the level of military cooperation and has formed the basis of 
some of Japan’s foreign policies. The three biggest barriers to greater military 
cooperation are: Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, the military export restrictions that 
Tokyo has imposed, and nuclear weapons. 
1. Article 9 
In the Constitution of Japan, between the chapters regarding the Emperor and the 
people, is the chapter, “Renunciation of War,” with just one article: 
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes. 
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In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.203 
This article is at the center of the debate regarding Japan’s use of the JSDF and part of the 
framework for Japan’s security, alongside the US treaty.204 Prime Minister Yoshida and 
his successors used Article 9 to prevent becoming entangled in US wars; it also prevented 
Japan from being able to contribute, beyond monetary support, to Operation Desert 
Storm.205 There are two approaches that politicians in Tokyo have looked at for dealing 
with Article 9: interpretation and constitutional revision. 
The first, interpreting the meaning of Article 9, has been used at various times in 
the past. Shidehara Kijuro, the presumed author of the article, argued that it banned any 
military capabilities or the participation in any war; but interpretation eventually fell to 
the cabinet and the CLB with the first official interpretation from Yoshida’s CLB that 
allowed Japan to resist invasion.206 Subsequent Prime Ministers have similarly used this 
ability, including Nobusuke Kishi, Sato Eisaku, Suzuki Zenko, and others, but it is 
limited.207 First, it has generally taken time to generate a reinterpretation, and any 
opposed to such a move can either delay it longer or prevent further changes, as happened 
in 1991. The citizens of Japan can also force the resignation of a Prime Minister who they 
see as going too far with revision, as was done to Kishi.208 The second limit comes from 
the wording of Article 9 itself. To date, politicians have been able to work around the 
wording, but they have done so when using the JSDF for peacekeeping missions. 
Renouncing “the threat or use of force” and “the right of belligerency” can only be 
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interpreted so far.209 Thus these two constraints work together to limit the effectiveness 
of further reinterpretation of Article 9. 
The second method for working with Article 9 is not really working with it, but 
rather rewriting it. This, however, is a daunting plan, as the Japanese constitution has yet 
to be amended. Article 96 of the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in each house, 
followed by a simple majority in a referendum or general election.210 Abe is the most 
recent to try for the elusive goal; however, the LDP’s partner New Komeito, as well as 
members of the LDP, are reluctant.  Rare street protests and a general dissatisfaction with 
the move have forced Abe to slow down.211  
While Japan and India focus on maritime security, exercises, peacekeeping, 
humanitarian aid, and other similar facets, Article 9 does not impact their relations. Other 
forms of military cooperation, to include collective security, become more difficult. In 
2014, Abe has begun another round of interpretations to allow some collective security, 
but even here he states: “What the Constitution allows for are only self-defense measures 
to maintain the existence of our country and protect our people. We will not use force for 
the sole purpose of defending a foreign country.” Thus Abe is willing to aid an ally if the 
conflict they are involved in threatens Japan but has not yet involved Japan. To date 
collective security has not been an issue for India and Japan; moreover, with India’s 
negative response to explicitly back the Philippines and Vietnam in their territorial 
disputes with China and its desires to remain free from alliances, it appears that India is 
currently not interested in collective security arrangements. 
Article 9 is likely to remain a factor for the foreseeable future, which means Japan 
will be limited in what it can offer India, or any other country, in terms of security 
cooperation. Moreover, the Japanese people do not appear likely to give up their pacifist 
stance. As long as India and Japan continue in their present course, Article 9 should not 
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impact their relationship; however, if circumstances change and India begins to seek 
mutual aid, Japan will be unable to respond quickly, if at all, with Article 9 in place. 
2. Military Export Restrictions 
Article 9 prohibits Japan from threatening war or possessing beyond the level of 
weapons granted in whatever interpretation is in force. It does not, however, restrict 
manufacturing weapons and exporting them.212 As the pacifist nature of Japan grew, 
however, the politicians in Tokyo added the self-imposed restraint of restricting arms 
exports.213 This policy has been in place for almost 50 years and places another 
restriction on defense and strategic cooperation with other countries, including India. 
In 1967, the Japanese Diet declared the “Three Principles of Arms Exports,” 
prohibiting arms exports to the following countries: 
1. communist block countries, 
2. countries subject to “arms”  exports embargo under the United Nations 
Security Council's resolutions, and 
3. countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.214 
Ten years later, Tokyo further restricted arms exports to all countries, regardless of 
destination, to be “in conformity with Japan’s position as a peace-loving nation.”215 
Further, the classification of arms technology was so strict that the PlayStation 2 was 
subject to the three principles due to its advanced processor, requiring a special permit 
before Sony was allowed to export it.216 India has difficulty meeting the initial principles, 
not to mention the broader ban, due to its border disputes with China and Pakistan and 
military intervention in Sri Lanka. 
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Recently, however, there have been signs that Japan is reconsidering its position. 
Before the twenty-first century, the United States was the only exception to this rule, and 
the exception was made under US pressure and to allow collaboration on the FS-X 
fighter.217 As the new century got underway, Japan began to soften further; Japan began 
joint development with the United States on a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system 
that would require not only knowledge but components transfer.218 Beyond its U.S. ally, 
Japan also sent equipment to Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines for rescue and 
maritime patrol operations as part of Tokyo’s anti-piracy campaign.219 While rescue 
equipment may not sound like arms, the coast guard cutters that Indonesia received in 
2007, that Vietnam is receiving, that the Philippines are in closed talks to get, and 
Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania are looking at do have direct military potential.220 Some 
of these countries have border disputes that could lead to conflict, and Vietnam, as a 
communist state, is definitely covered in the three principles, but Japan has still seen fit to 
send ships or consider doing so. 
India is also a beneficiary of this opening policy. In December 2013, a Joint 
Working Group met to discuss the sale of the Japanese US-2 amphibian aircraft, seen in 
Figure 8, to India.221 This airplane can serve as a search and rescue, surveillance, and 
resupply platform that can land in rough seas and has an impressive range of 4,500 
km.222 This move goes further than the coast guard ships for two reasons. First, the US-2 
deal may now include provisions for India to produce part of the aircraft, creating new 
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economic and development ties.223 Second, because the US-2 is part of the JSDF 
inventory, some view it as the first time Japan has exported arms since the Three 
Principles were released in 1967, while others, including Japanese defense officials, insist 
that the dual use nature and lack of armaments keep it within the three principles.224 
 
Figure 8.  US-2 Amphibious Aircraft225  
The development of the US-2 deal is a start for Japan-India military procurement 
cooperation. It also shows parallels to constitutional interpretation; while the Three 
Principles of Arms Exports has not been changed, its implementation has been softened. 
Where the Japanese once required special permission to export game consoles due to 
their dual use capability, now military aircraft can be exported as long as they don’t have 
guns or bombs. While this is a start, there is much more room for cooperation; moreover, 
the Three Principles are still in place, making cooperation more difficult to achieve. 
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3. Nuclear Weapons 
The issue of nuclear weapons is an international one through the nonproliferation 
regime, but in many countries it can also be a powerful domestic one. With Japan being 
the only country to have nuclear weapons used against them, it can be a particularly 
strong domestic issue that potentially stands in the way of closer ties with India after 
India armed itself with nuclear weapons. 
Japan has held to its non-nuclear stance fairly consistently for over half a century. 
In 1957, Prime Minister Kishi declared that Japan had no intention of acquiring nuclear 
weapons.226 Prime Minister Sato Eisaku strengthened the non-nuclear stance 10 years 
later by announcing the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-production, 
and non-introduction.”227 In 2006, Japan released its latest disarmament policy and non-
proliferation policy; the first sentence reads: “The year 2005 marked the sixtieth 
anniversary of the horrific atomic bombings suffered by Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
1945.”228 Further, the first reason Japan gives for pursuing disarmament and non-
proliferation is that Japan “has responsibility for demonstrating the devastation of nuclear 
weapons as the only state that has suffered the horrific effects of atomic bombs.”229 It 
thus appears that Japan’s non-nuclear principles remain unchanged and tied to its WWII 
experience. 
While Prime Minister Mori’s visit opened the door for more interaction and closer 
ties, nuclear weapons remain a thorn in Japan-India relations.230 Japan lifted some of its 
sanctions in 2000, but others remained until this year. In 2008, Tokyo “reluctantly” 
agreed to India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver, but remains skeptical of the US 
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nuclear deal with India.231 When Prime Minister Singh met with Prime Minister Fukuda 
to discuss Japan’s support for the waiver, Fukuda told him: “We will consider it, but we 
hope you will respond appropriately to what the international community, including our 
country, is concerned about,” which refers back to Japan’s repeated requests that India 
sign the CTBT and the NPT.232 Japan did not get any guarantees concerning the treaties, 
but the U.S. deal did have safeguards to prevent foreign nuclear supplies ending up in 
Indian nuclear weapons. This includes verification visits that track fuel from foreign 
suppliers throughout their use in India’s reactors; however, these measures have yet to be 
implemented, which is one reason for Japan’s doubts regarding the U.S.-India nuclear 
deal.233 
Even with Japan’s agreement to the waiver, India’s ability to strike deals with 
other countries for nuclear power is limited because of Japan’s corner on certain markets. 
For instance, 80 percent of large forged components for nuclear reactors are produced by 
Japan Steel Works.234 Talks for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries did 
start in 2010; however, the Fukushima Daiichi accident following the Tsunami in March 
2011 caused the negotiations to be suspended until 2013.235 Two sticking points in the 
negotiations are Japan’s insistence that spent fuel be returned to Japan for processing and 
that any reactor components that come from Japan be returned if India tests another 
nuclear weapon.236 For Japan, these measures reduce the risk of indirectly supporting 
nuclear weapons; however, India has concerns regarding the safety and feasibility of 
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transporting these components due to the radioactive contamination entailed.237 Another 
issue is Japan’s insistence that all of the U.S.-India deal be implemented, which could 
also reduce the possibility of Japanese supplies ending up in India’s nuclear weapons, but 
is contingent on the United States.238 While Japan may have opened up toward India and 
is moving forward in other areas of their relationship, nuclear issues are still a sticking 
point. 
There are elements within Japan that have a different view on nuclear weapons. 
Some of these have been around for a while; for instance when Prime Minister Kishi 
announced that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons in 1957, he also succeeded in 
getting the CLB to state that acquiring them would not be unconstitutional.239 The 
Japanese government has been open enough to nuclear weapons itself that it conducted 
studies considering acquiring nuclear weapons on four occasions: after China’s 1964 
nuclear test, before ratifying the NPT, when the NPT’s indefinite extension was 
approaching, and most recently during the North Korean nuclear crisis.240 Each of these 
times, however, it was considered both domestically and internationally to be in Japan’s 
best interest to remain nuclear free.241 In the last decade, the arguments that Japan needs 
to consider nuclear weapons have become more open. For example, Nishibe Susumu 
stated that Japan should either become the fifty-first state or “assert its independence and 
go nuclear” while Nakanishi Terumasa feels Japan should acquire nuclear weapons if 
China’s navy can threaten Okinawa or the Senkaku Islands.242 Finally, in 2011, the 
Sankei Shimbun, a right leaning newspaper in Japan, reported a survey where 86.7 
percent of Japanese felt that the diet should have discuss the possibilities of acquiring 
nuclear weapons.243 But while more voices have begun calling for nuclear weapons and 
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more of the population is open to discussing them, it does not mean that there is strong 
support for nuclear weapons or nuclear power at home or abroad. National polls before 
Fukushima showed nearly two-thirds of Japan supported nuclear power, where now 
nearly 60 percent oppose restarting Japan’s nuclear plants.244 
While there has been talk in Japan about changing its nuclear stance, it has never 
gone beyond the discussion. Moreover, with the renewed negativity and attention after 
Fukushima, Japan’s leadership cannot drift too far from public opinion. Both the official 
statements and delays in a civil-nuclear agreement with India indicate that Tokyo will 
likely not change their position on nuclear proliferation or acquisition anytime soon. This 
position, in turn, will keep a wedge between Japan and India, at least on nuclear 
cooperation and power production. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Within Japanese domestic politics, there are elements that can both pull India 
closer and push it away. Japan’s increasing activism on the world stage and its increasing 
nationalism, along with the vision of various leaders, have complemented other factors 
that drive India and Japan closer together. Moreover, Japan’s pacifist culture that 
developed since WWII does not appear to have interfered with Japan’s growing security 
cooperation with India. The anti-nuclear movement in Japan has rebounded since 
Fukushima, possibly providing more resistance to nuclear cooperation. While the absence 
of a nuclear deal has not blocked other elements of Japan and India’s interaction, it does 
have the potential to poison the well if Japan’s reticence prevents India from gaining 
nuclear power technology and power plants from other countries as well.  
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India is home to 1.2 billion people who are divided by multiple ethnicities, 
religions, and languages.245 India is also a democracy where each of these different 
groups seeks to be heard, causing an array of issues. Some of these factors have already 
been discussed in other contexts, like India’s nuclear program. There are other elements, 
however, that have not been covered in the previous chapters; therefore, this chapter 
discusses these domestic factors and their ability to influence sustained relations between 
Japan and India. 
A. FACTORS THAT CAN PROMOTE SUSTAINED RELATIONS 
During the Cold War, New Delhi attempted to remain neutral; it traded with both 
sides, remained a member of the British Commonwealth, and maintained an independent 
foreign policy. India supported the communist insurgency in Vietnam and anti-
communist forces in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Burma based on the nationalist nature of 
each.246 The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in 1971, however, 
moved them more towards the USSR as the Cold War progressed. When the Iron Curtain 
fell, India realized that its relationship with regional powers like China, Japan, and the 
United States were underdeveloped and its economy was dragging.247 As mentioned 
previously, India began to liberalize its economy. At the same time, India began looking 
out as it grew, looking east for new engagement, and endeavoring to develop its 
infrastructure. 
1. Looking Out: India’s Rising Power Status 
For many in India, their country has either always been a great power or destined 
to become one. According to Nehru, India was a world power, not because of military 
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strength, but because it was a leader against war and poverty.248 Former Cabinet Foreign 
Service Officer Pavan Varma stated: “We [Indians] are emerging slowly as an important 
face in the area of politics, economics and the military. In the field of culture, however, 
we have always been a superpower, given our civilizational depth and antiquity.”249 But 
while Indian leaders may have felt that India had a place among the great powers, they 
have not always been able to assert that role internationally. 
Initially, India tried to become the leader of an independent Asia and a larger non-
aligned movement throughout the world; however, the Sino-Indian war and strength of 
the U.S. and USSR impeded India’s goal. Following these events India focused on more 
immediate security concerns, including fighting Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 and dealing 
with various separatist movements throughout India.250 After the Cold War, India began 
to reach out again, becoming involved in multilateral forums, including some that have 
already been mentioned. India also reached out bilaterally; as seen in Figure 9, India 
more than doubled its bilateral defense agreements in the 1990s before almost tripling 
them the next decade. These connections include European nations like Poland, Ukraine, 
Italy, and Germany; African states like Madagascar and Nigeria; and many of their 
neighbors, and as seen in Table 2. 
                                                 
248 Robert W. Bradnock, India’s Foreign Policy Since 1971 (New York: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1990), 109. 
249 Pavan Varma, quoted in Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?, 222. 
250 Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 43, 67; Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology, and Religion: 
Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast,” in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, eds. Satu 





Figure 9.  India’s Bilateral Defense Agreements251  
As India has grown, it has been drawn into world politics as Satyavrata Patel said 
might happen with the passage of time and growing strength.252 This expansion of 
India’s outreach has included Japan. Just as India-Japan relations began to improve in 
2000, India’s Minister of Defense Mr. Hernandez visited Japan; three years later, the 
Ishiba, Japan’s Minister of State for Defense visited India.253  Japan and India share in 
exercises and delegations, forums, and agreements like many of the other countries listed 
in Table 2. In short, India’s efforts to expand international connections in keeping with its 
self-image as an important and growing global power has been one driver of enhanced 
relations with Japan.   
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Table 2.   India’s Defense Relationships254  
Relationship Countries 
Defense Cooperation Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, China, France, Germany, Japan, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Russia, 
South Africa, Ukraine, UAE, U.S., and eight ASEAN states 
Information Sharing 
or Protection 
Australia, Germany, Israel, and Myanmar 
Defense Equipment France, Italy, Russia, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, United 
Kingdom (UK), U.S., Uzbekistan, and Vietnam 
Overseas Basing Madagascar and Tajikistan 
Military Training Singapore 
Coast Guard 
Cooperation 
Japan and South Korea 
Bilateral Forums Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mozambique, Oman, Poland, Russia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, UAE, UK, and U.S. 
Delegations to India Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Oman, Poland, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Tajikistan, UAE, UK, U.S., and five ASEAN states 
Exercises Australia, Brazil, China, France, Israel, Japan, Oman, Russia, 
South Africa, Tajikistan, UK, U.S., and eight ASEAN states 
Defense Sales Brazil, France, Germany, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Russia, UK, 
and U.S. 
 
2. Looking East 
The British had been active in Southeast Asia during its colonial era, making 
India active in the region as well, but after independence and India’s economy turned 
inward, India maintained less interaction with most states of the region. After the end of 
the Cold War, India adopted its Look East policy and New Delhi again became involved 
in Southeast Asia. Economically, the 10 countries in ASEAN make up roughly the same 
amount of trade as China, the U.S. or UAE.255 Politically, India became increasingly 
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involved in ASEAN, as previously discussed.256 Bilaterally, India has also increased 
relations with most ASEAN members; while initially focused on economic relations in 
Southeast Asia, India now has defense related agreements and conducts naval exercises 
with the majority of ASEAN states, as seen in Table 2. 
While much of India’ Look East policy initially focused on Southeast Asia, this 
expanded to other states to India’s east, including South Korea, Australia, China, and 
Japan. Australia and Japan. India has been building defense (as seen in Table 2), political, 
and economic relations with all four of these countries as it builds ties and influence in 
the region and around the world. Thus, the Look East policy, informed by India’s own 
historical legacy as much as geostrategic considerations, has provided additional impetus 
to its outreach to Japan. 
3. India’s Development 
India has faced endemic develop challenges since its independence. According to 
the World Bank, 24.7 percent of Indians live below the poverty line of $1.25 a day in 
PPP.257 The Global Slavery Index states that over 14 million Indians live in slavery, 
which it defines as “one person depriving another person of their freedom,” whether as 
forced marriage, exploitation of children, forced prostitution, or other activities.258 This 
places one-third of the world’s poor and slave population within India.259 Indian 
politicians have been working to combat this problem for some time; 20 years ago nearly 
50 percent of Indians lived below the poverty line.260 Prime Minister Modi is continuing 
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this pursuit by various means, including his plan to have power in every home in India 
and sufficient power for farming, business, and manufacturing in five years.261   
Japan, as one of the world’s more advanced nations, is in a good position to help 
India with such projects. Japan has sent more ODA to India than any other country since 
2003.262 Beyond loans, the ODA has also shifted over the years from grants to technical 
aid, as seen in Figure 10, which has a higher potential of making India’s economy more 
efficient. From 2000 to 2010, Japan gave India over $25 billion in loans and $755 million 
in grants, as seen in Table 3.263 In 2010 alone, Japan’s ODA included over $152 million 
for the Andhra Pradesh Rural High Voltage Distribution System for energy infrastructure, 
over $364 million for rail, road, and mass transit systems, and several other projects seen 
in Figure 11.264 When Prime Minister Modi visited Japan in 2014, Prime Minister Abe 
increased Japan’s ODA by promising aid and loans totaling $35 billion over the next five 
years, including bullet trains, industrial corridors, environmental cleaning, and more.265  
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Figure 10.  Japan’s ODA for India by Scheme266  
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Figure 11.  Japan’s Main ODA Projects in FY 2010267  
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Table 3.   Japan’s ODA for India by Scheme (million dollars)268  
Fiscal Year ODA Loan Grant Aid Technical Cooperation 
2000 1.601 0.155 0.076 
2001 5.555 0.121 0.086 
2002 9.411 0.077 0.081 
2003 10.575 0.148 0.087 
2004 11.376 0.253 0.082 
2005 13.151 0.178 0.071 
2006 15.642 0.050 0.111 
2007 19.046 0.034 0.104 
2008 19.969 0.036 0.100 
2009 18.467 0.032 0.157 
2010 17.221 0.098 Not Available 
Total 142.014 1.182 0.955 
 
By moving closer to Japan, New Delhi has been able to further improve the 
infrastructure throughout India, which helps improve the quality of life for the 
population. As seen by the large numbers of poor or repressed people in India, there is 
still much that can be done; however, India has taken steps to alleviate some of the 
problems and much of this has been possible through Japan-India relations. 
B. NEHRUVIANISM AND NON-ALIGNMENT 
In international relations theory, there are various theories or groups of theories, 
like realism and liberalism; in India, the theories predominately subscribed to are these 
two and a third that is called Nehruvianism.269 According to those who describe 
themselves as Nehruvians, “states and people can come to understand each other better, 
and thereby make and sustain peace.”270 It is influenced by the ideals of Nehru, hence the 
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name, and the non-violent tenets of Mahatma Gandhi.271 The concept has some 
commonalities with liberalism, including a belief that the threat of war can be mitigated 
or eliminated through international institutions and law, but also by “cooperation, free 
intercourse between societies, and regard for the well-being of people everywhere.” 
Nehruvians, moreover, hold that preparing for war is “ruinous and futile” because it takes 
resources away from other endeavors while not preventing war.272 As Japan and India’s 
recent relationship growth has been most active in defense cooperation, much of the 
India-Japan connection has yet to express Nehruvian principles. 
At the same time, Nehruvians see nuclear weapons as “an abomination” and 
universal disarmament as an achievable goal.273 This aim holds well with Japan’s strong 
support of nonproliferation and could bring this group closer to Japan. Nehruvians, 
however, also see the NPT as discriminatory and advocate not signing it, where the 
Japanese see the NPT and CTBT as a pathway to universal disarmament. 
Another point that Nehruvians hold to is nonalignment. Nonalignment does not 
mean non-involvement; instead, Nehru described it: “as far as possible to keep away from 
the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which has led in the past to 
world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale.”274 For some 
Nehruvians, the U.S. is still an imperialist power that has to be countered.275 This too can 
complicate India-Japan relations, as Japan is still a treaty ally of the United States. For 
others, however, nonalignment is less about opposing the major powers and more about 
“having no prior commitment coupled with dynamic participation in world affairs.”276 To 
this group, establishing relationships with countries throughout the world, including 
Japan and the United States, is desirable, so long as no ironclad treaties are entered into 
that would bind India’s options. 
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After Nehru’s time, Indian foreign policy has tended to move toward more 
pragmatism, realism, or liberalism. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and 
Cooperation, India’s nuclear weapons program, growing military, and more are all 
examples of this trend. While the Nehruvian influence appears to be diminishing, it can 
still be a factor in Indian politics. In May of 2014, Sonia Gandhi, president of India’s 
Congress Party, stated that the pillars of Nehruvianism, which includes nonalignment, 
formed the core of the party’s beliefs despite their being challenged within Indian 
politics.277 At the same time, however, Sonia Gandhi also admitted that the application of 
Nehruvian principles has to change. Similarly, in 2012 a group of Indian analysts and 
policy makers drafted a document titled Nonalignment 2.0, which advocated a variety of 
policies, including keeping the United States involved in Asia to maintain the current 
balance, while avoiding an alliance to maintain autonomy, and developing increased 
military projection capability in order to use hard power.278 Many of the 
recommendations are more realist in nature, but the avoidance of alliance and the title 
indicate a level of Nehruvian influence. Thus while not always a guiding principle, 
Nehruvianism still influences India’s foreign policy.  
For Japan-India relations, the implications of Nehruvianism are mixed. If Japan is 
seen as an American ally, those with strong Nehruvian tendencies could want to distance 
India from Japan. Conversely, Japan’s strong anti-nuclear stance and post WWII peaceful 
reputation could draw these same people to greater ties with Japan. Thus, Nehruvianism 
would have an ambivalent influence on Indo-Japanese relations; but its waning role in 
India generally diminishes its impact relative to other drivers of that bilateral interaction. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Much of India’s domestic factors draw it closer to Japan. New Delhi’s greater 
involvement in world affairs and its growing strength have been part of bringing the two 
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countries closer together; moreover, the two share several common goals like those 
discussed in previous chapters. India and Japan are also both involved in Southeast Asia 
after India’s Look East policy that began in the 1990s. India’s attempt to improve its 
infrastructure along with Japan’s willingness to help build India’s infrastructure and 
workforce through ODA, as well as Japanese companies’ increased investments, also 
contributes to India’s desire to establish relations. India’s political culture, with the 
influence of Nehru and Gandhi, is more complicated, but has the potential to guide policy 




This thesis began with the question of whether growing Japan-India relations are 
transient or building into a new fixture in international affairs. In order to answer this 
question, the thesis has examined various underlying causes to determine the effect they 
have had on the relationship over the past 15 years, in order to better understand the 
motivations behind Tokyo and New Delhi’s decision to foster growing ties. This analysis 
allows some extrapolation of the future course of India-Japan relations depending on 
changes or continuity in the causal factors. 
A. PRIMARY MOTIVATOR 
When looking at the various factors that could drive Japan-India relations, the rise 
of China and subsequent need to create or maintain a balance in the region appears to 
have taken the dominant role. Balance of power in this case does not mean or require 
strategic alliances in the vein of NATO and Warsaw Pact. While these kind of alliances 
could happen, this round of balancing relates more to countries’ influence in international 
institutions, neighboring countries, trade, military might and cooperation, and 
international opinion. Instead of directly opposing another country, the steps taken to 
balance to date have been ones to prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon 
while simultaneously attempting to avoid provoking retaliation, whether diplomatic, 
economic, or military. 
India has been working to balance China for decades; India signed a treaty with 
the Soviet Union whose main purpose was balancing against China. While other factors 
were present, India’s nuclear program again attempts to balance China’s program and its 
aid to Pakistan’s nuclear program. India’s Look East policy came after India lost the 
economic and political support of the USSR and Soviet Bloc, which also meant a loss of 
balance with China. 
Since WWII, Japan did not need to worry about balancing with China, both 
because its economy and strength grew first and due to the security alliance with the 
United States. As China rose and Japan’s security situation became more tenuous, Japan 
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began to seek out partners, including Australia and India. China’s more vocal stance on 
issues like the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and other WWII 
topics has contributed to Japan’s concerns over China and led to a balancing strategy. 
B. SECONDARY FACTORS 
While the need to establish a balance vis-à-vis China is the primary factor, other 
factors enabled India and Japan to follow that driver more comfortably. These include 
Japan and India’s increasing activity in world affairs, the lack of animosity between the 
two countries, and U.S. policy. 
Japan and India’s separate but similar moves to become more active on the world 
stage opened the door to greater communication. For India, some of this can be tied to a 
desire to balance China; however, India would have needed to reach out after the collapse 
of the Soviet Bloc for economic purposes. Japan, in contrast, began to be more involved 
in international politics initially in the 1970s with ASEAN. It increased its movement 
toward greater involvement after the first Gulf War and the criticism it received for its 
lack of participation. These events happened before Japan-China relations started to 
decline in the mid-1990s. If India had reached west instead of east, or Japan had 
remained secluded politically, they may not have been in a position to reach out; 
conversely, without China Japan would have had fewer incentives to become closer to 
India. 
The second factor that complements balance of power reasoning is the lack of 
baggage. For Japan, South Korea is much closer, would also be subject to a hegemonic 
China, has existing strong economic ties, shares a second security threat in North Korea, 
and is already a U.S. ally. Hence, South Korea would seem to be a natural Japanese ally.  
However, the historical issues of colonization, including Yasukuni Shrine and comfort 
women, and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands territorial dispute have consistently gotten in 
the way. In contrast, while India may be further away and have fewer ties, it also has 
fewer complications.  
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India does not have the same historical problem in the same measure with its 
nearer potential allies. However, with both China and Pakistan as adversaries, smaller 
countries like Nepal and Bangladesh have less to contribute to any balancing effort. 
Finally, the United States has also played a role in developing Japan-India 
relations primarily due to its alliance with Japan and recently improved relations with 
India. With Bill Clinton’s initial visit to India in 2000, the United States signaled that it 
was prepared to work with India and accept India’s nuclear program. This gave Prime 
Minister Mori more maneuvering room with India. If the United States had been harder 
on India in 1998 and continued to pressure India to drop its nuclear program, Japan 
would have had less reason to change its own policy of attempting to punish India for its 
nuclear weapons tests in 1998. 
C. TERTIARY AND NEGATIVE FACTORS 
Many of the other factors assessed in this thesis have been shown to have not had 
an impact on India and Japan’s strengthening relationship, like economic and cultural 
ties. Other factors, primarily at the multilateral level, have been influenced by the balance 
of power calculations in ways that makes it difficult to fully separate the two.  
When Japan and India began to foster greater ties, their bilateral trade was 
shrinking in percentage and their cultural links were small. After 14 years of 
strengthening the bilateral relationship, these factors haven’t changed, even though both 
governments have taken steps to try and build this part of the relationship. Perhaps Ghosh 
and Jaiswal are correct in asserting that the lack of these connections has prevented India 
and Japan from becoming even closer; however, their absence has not prevented the 
formation of the relationship or its continued growth to this point. 
The multilateral engagement of Japan and India, while providing more forums for 
interaction, has not been a decisive factor. First, the cooperation on UNSC reform has not 
been a powerful enough magnet, as evidenced by Japan’s relations to Brazil and 
Germany. Second, the maritime security aim and others could also be achieved strictly 
through the multilateral realm without the growing bilateral ties as Japan has been 
achieving this with ASEAN. Third, the impetus to balance China can be seen in some of 
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Japan and India’s calculations in these multilateral organizations, including Japan’s 
insistence on India’s membership in the EAS. 
D. WILD CARD: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ENERGY 
While India’s nuclear program initially was a non-starter for a Japan-India 
partnership, this changed in the two years after the Pokhoran II tests. The change did not 
go so far as Japan accepting India’s nuclear program with open arms, but the importance 
of the issue dropped significantly. The reasons for this change from major factor to 
annoyance appear to be Japan’s worsening security situation with China’s rise, North 
Korea’s nuclear program, increased hostility from South Korea, and the United States’ 
relative decline, and in particular Washington’s acceptance of India’s nuclear program. 
These same issues have also opened Japan further to the possibility of some forms of 
arms exports and cooperation, including the joint development and production of a 
ballistic missile defense system with the United States and the planned export of the US-2 
aircraft to India.  
Japan has not, however, given up on the nonproliferation regime. Every year, 
Japan still puts forth proposals at the UN for disarmament and nonproliferation. Japan 
also continues to ask India to sign the NPT and CTBT. Finally, Japan and India have yet 
to come to an agreement on nuclear power cooperation, in part because of Japanese 
concerns regarding India’s nuclear weapons program. 
E. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
With a desire to balance China’s power and influence in the region as the primary 
factor, the prospects for India-Japan relations appear to rest on China’s future behavior. 
As long as China remains a major regional actor, Japan and India will likely continue to 
work together and build the relationship. Conversely, if China were to cease to be an 
issue, Tokyo and New Delhi would have fewer incentives to continue the relationship. 
There are, however, some important caveats to this argument, including nuclear tests and 
momentum, and how China may exit the picture. 
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While Japan has lowered the priority of nuclear nonproliferation when dealing 
with India, it has remained an issue. Japan and India commenced nuclear negotiations 
nearly five years ago, and still have not reached an accommodation. One of the sticking 
points is Japan’s insistence that any nuclear-related material exported from Japan is to be 
returned if India conducts another nuclear test. If India were to conduct another nuclear 
test, particularly with a renewed antinuclear sentiment among the population after 
Fukushima, Japan’s leaders may be forced to employ another round of punitive action 
against India due to domestic considerations. 
In the opposite direction, if the need to balance China vanished, Japan and India 
could continue to strengthen their relationship due to the momentum already generated. 
Japan and India now work together in maritime security, conduct annual exercises, and 
have signed a comprehensive trade agreement. Japan has also committed to an array of 
development programs in India, and Japanese companies are continuing to invest in 
India, creating the potential for greater economic ties than currently exist. Japanese and 
Indian leaders from divergent political parties have also chosen to maintain the current 
course on the bilateral relationship. If no event occurs to push the two apart, Japan and 
India could continue to maintain the relationship’s current state. They would however, 
lose a strong incentive for building the relationship further or maintaining it in the face of 
adversity. 
Finally, the variation in the ways by which China’s “rise” might reverse could 
have a dramatic impact on the direction of future Indo-Japan relations. Any forecasting 
here is highly problematic as the changes needed to reverse China’s rise would be 
massive or dramatic. Moreover, because of China’s size, position in Asia, and growing 
economy and military, a sudden reversal is highly improbable. 
F. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Japan-India relationship will likely continue to grow in the future, as its 
principal catalyst is reaction to a rising China, which will presumably remain an 
important player in Asia and the world. This strengthening of Indo-Japanese ties favors 
the current U.S. strategy in Asia. The United States, as a secondary factor, also has the 
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ability to encourage the growth if India-Japan relations, including working with both 
countries bilaterally and trilaterally, as well as encouraging Japan to reach an 
accommodation in their nuclear power negotiations. Conversely, Washington’s options 
are limited if it wished to prevent closer ties from being built. But current regional 
circumstances provide little reason for the United States to want to inhibit that 
relationship.  
With balancing China being the primary factor driving Japan and India closer 
together, both countries (as well as the United States to the extent of its involvement) 
need to be careful not to unnecessarily antagonize China. This can be done by each 
country continuing its bilateral engagements with China. Establishing a trilateral 
relationship between Japan, India, and China, or a quadrilateral relationship including the 
United States, might also help to lubricate the shifting balances of power in Asia. 
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